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Some Economic Implications  
of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Nebraska 
It is now clear that the spread, mortality and morbidity 
impacts of the coronavirus pandemic are sizeable but 
extremely heterogeneous across multiple dimensions. 
Geography shows that places with lower human con-
centrations (urban/rural divide) and away from main 
travel axes, such as major interstate highways and in-
ternational airports, have a lower incidence of cases. 
Large urban centers with high human concentrations 
have been much disproportionally affected and with 
much higher mortality rates. Age and health status are 
equally important. Mortality increases dramatically for 
people 60 years old and older. People with comorbidi-
ties (cardiovascular, obesity, diabetes, and others) are 
much more likely to be hospitalized and die of COVID
-19 than are healthy people. Family and household 
composition is also important. Multigenerational 
households are much more common in say Italy than 
in Sweden. Swedish households tend to live more inde-
pendently often in one-person households, which pro-
vides some “cultural” self-isolation, which is helpful in 
case of a pandemic. In addition, medical infrastructure 
and preparedness vary greatly across states with devas-
tating consequences like in New York City, partly be-
cause the pandemic hit early, and partly because of the 
lack of intensive care unit (ICU) infrastructure 
(COVID-19 Project). States in the Midwest had more 
time to prepare and learn to ramp up testing etc. 
In contrast to this great heterogeneity, most states in 
the U.S. are pursuing quite similar blanket distancing 
policies (so-called Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions 
or NPIs) to reduce the spread of the disease and to 
manage the finite medical capacity to treat severely 
affected people. All these factors combined produced 
dramatic and tragic crises in and around New York  
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  4-17-20 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  130.00  *  * 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  183.34  163.94  159.46 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  155.53  130.57  113.82 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  232.50  243.03  NA 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  81.17  *  NA 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85.88  77.36  NA 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  152.54  162.84  162.25 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  378.29  428.82  429.98 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.83  4.42  4.52 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.44  3.22  2.84 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  7.75  8.24  7.64 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.36  5.52  5.61 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.29  3.32  3.25 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .        * 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  123.33  90.00  90.00 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  *  85.00  85.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  133.50  164.80  211.67 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46.00  51.54  57.24 
 ⃰ No Market          
City, and surreal halted situations like in much of Nebraska 
with arrested economic and social activities and a manage-
able medical situation and much fewer deaths.  
To this economist, comes the question: Given this incredi-
ble heterogeneity in outcomes and conditions, can we de-
sign less costly policies to manage the pandemic within our 
state and cities? Policies are at the local, state, national and 
global levels. We only control a subset of these policies, but 
it is worth considering whether we could design better-
targeted policies which could achieve distancing at a lower 
economic cost.  
In the following sections, I first provide some context on 
public health and mortality in Nebraska and the projected 
impact of COVID-19 on mortality. I discuss the gross ben-
efits of current NPI policies in terms of reduced mortality 
and morbidity. I follow with a discussion of the economic 
costs from the pandemic and NPIs for Nebraska. Then, I 
discuss policy options to take advantage of the noted heter-
ogeneity within Nebraska, and relative to other states and 
countries affected by the pandemic. I also discuss some pol-
icy issues at the local and state levels, which may help re-
start economic activity. 
The Public Health Context in Nebraska 
Projected deaths from COVID-19 
First, let us discuss what is projected to happen with 
COVID-19 in Nebraska. The University of Washington’s 
projections (the “Murray” model and the COVID-19 Pro-
ject) is the major model used to predict the state-level im-
pact of the pandemic. The recently projected total deaths 
from COVID-19 for Nebraska hover around a total of 270-
290 deaths by August 4, with a large uncertainty interval 
(ranging from as low as 50 to as high as 1,000). Earlier pro-
jections from the Murray model were around 450 deaths. 
When comparing recent projections and actual data, pro-
jections seem to overstate deaths so far. For example, as of 
April 16, 2020, Nebraska had 24 deaths, while the Murray 
projections of April 13 predicted 31 deaths by the same 
date. Therefore, the upper boundary of the projections of 
1,000 deaths appears very unlikely at this point. It just re-
flects the challenge of epidemiological modeling. These 
models do not say anything about subsequent waves of the 
pandemic, which are likely to occur, given that herd im-
munization is not taking place. 
Mortality in Nebraska 
The latest detailed data from the CDC on causes of death in 
Nebraska is for 2017. The data are shown in Table 1 along 
with projected deaths due to COVID-19 up to August 4. 
There are no projections available for beyond August 2020, 
that is, for subsequent waves of infections. 
The table shows the importance of chronic respiratory 
diseases, heart diseases, diabetes, flu and pneumonia 
in the patterns of mortality in Nebraska. These causes 
of death in Table 1 are major comorbidities afflicting 
COVID-19 patients, who are critically ill. It is difficult 
to sort out exactly what a unique cause of death is. 
The CDC counts any death with COVID-19 as a 
COVID-19 death, possibly over-counting these. Pro-
jected COVID-19 deaths are less than 2% of total 
deaths (2017 CDC deaths + projected COVID-19 
deaths). 
NPIs aim is at “flattening the curve” to decrease the 
mortality and morbidity of COVID-19. It is hard to 
know what the impact of a counterfactual experiment 
would be. Most countries and states have imposed 
NPIs to various degrees and one cannot observe a 
natural experiment (with and without NPIs). Regard-
ing mortality, the early projections by Ferguson et al. 
in the United Kingdom had predicted 2.2 million 
deaths from COVID-19 in the U.S. without interven-
tion and about 1.1 million deaths with NPIs,. That is 
roughly a 50%-decrease in deaths induced by NPIs. 
Note that these early projections are out of range with 
current projections for the U.S. from the Murray 
model, or even with the consensus estimates provided 
by the White House (100,000 to 240,000 deaths). 
Greenstone and Nigam use Ferguson et al. and ac-
count for additional lives saved with NPIs by reduc-
ing the number of sick people needing intensive care, 
and who could not access it from a lack of ICUs 
(constrained medical capacity). They estimate that in 
addition to Ferguson et al. estimates, about 630,000 
lives would be saved in the U.S. by reducing the ex-
cess demand for intensive care. What are the implica-
tions of these national estimates for Nebraska? 
If we accept the assumption of doubling the number 
of deaths in the absence of NPIs, then these policies 
are projected to save about 280 lives in our state. Ne-
braska has a first-rate medical infrastructure that can 
accommodate a much larger number of people need-
ing intensive care (COVID-19 Project) than the ca-
pacity that is needed under NPIs. According to the 
COVID-19 Project, Nebraska has 232 ICU beds avail-
able for COVID-19 patients. With NPIs in place, the 
projected need, for ICU beds dedicated to COVID-19 
cases, is fewer than 100. The medical infrastructure 
could accommodate twice as many intensive-care cas-
es without hitting its limit. Therefore, NPIs will not 
save additional lives because of a limited medical ca-
pacity in Nebraska. This is unlike what is predicted 
for the nation as a whole, by Greenstone and Nigam.  
 
Table 1. CDC Mortality Data in Nebraska for 2017 by Major Causes 
  
Cause 
Number of 
deaths 
Share of 
total 
1.  Heart Disease 3,581 20.9% 
2. Cancer 3,502 20.4% 
3. Chronic Lower Respiratory Disease 1,224 7.1% 
4. Accidents 811 4.7% 
5. Stroke 760 4.4% 
6. Alzheimer’s disease 698 4.1% 
7. Diabetes 575 3.4% 
8. Flu/Pneumonia 393 2.3% 
9. Suicide 275 1.6% 
10. Hypertension 274 1.6% 
Other causes 
Firearm Deaths 160 0.9% 
Drug Poisoning Deaths 152 0.9% 
Homicide 50 0.3% 
Traffic Deaths 228 1.3% 
COVID-19 Deaths (projected in April under NPIs to 8/4) 280 1.63% 
   
Total Deaths 2017 (CDC data) 16,878 98.37% 
   
Total Deaths + projected deaths under NPI 17,158 100.00% 
NPIs also decrease morbidity. Nebraska also should expect 
savings from the reduced morbidity induced by NPIs. Hos-
pital stays tend to be longer for COVID-19 patients and 
complications require intensive care. The COVID-19 Project 
provides estimates of daily new hospital admissions and new 
ICU cases as well as how many ventilators are needed daily 
until August 4. One can sum up the new admissions and 
ICU cases to get total projected admissions (1370) and ICU 
cases (350). Counting the number of cases involving ventila-
tors is a bit more difficult because patients on ventilators 
tend to stay in ventilation for several days. About 88% of 
ICU stays require ventilation based on the Murray model 
(mean daily IC bed/mean ventilator daily use). Hence, to 
estimate the total cases of ventilated ICUs, I take 88% of 350 
or 308 cases of ventilations for Nebraska. Again, if we accept  
the premise of doubling the morbidity of COVID-19 
without NPIs, these figures indicate the reduced mor-
bidity induced by NPIs. 
Some Economic Implications of these Reduced 
Health Incidences 
How to value the reduced mortality induced by NPIs? 
Economists use a concept called value of a statistical 
life (VSL), which captures the willingness to pay to 
reduce the risk of death by a small amount. The typical 
example is that people are willing to pay $10 to reduce 
the risk of death by 0.000001. Scale that number up by 
a million, and this means that society is willing to pay 
$10 million to save one life. The VSL in the U.S. 
hovers around $10 million per death avoided. This is  
the dollar value society is willing to pay to decrease mortali-
ty risk by one death. This is not the value of life as it is often 
misunderstood. VSL is used in cost-benefit analysis for pro-
jects having impacts on mortality, like new road projects. A 
safer road infrastructure reduces car accidents and associat-
ed deaths. In the cost-benefit analysis, the projected reduc-
tion in mortality is valued using VSL. People still face risk 
in traffic (no zero risk), and drive accepting that risk but 
value the fact that driving is safer, post project. Table 1 
shows actually that traffic accidents killed 228 Nebraskans 
in 2017 (and 249 in 2019). People are not told to stop driv-
ing.  
VSL varies by age, income levels, and other factors; but the 
$10 million figure has been used by many studies and is 
generally accepted as a reference value. Note that with 
COVID-19, the majority of deaths take place among the 
elderly. In Italy and France, for which large datasets are 
available, the average age at death from COVID-19 was 
around 80 years of age. CDC data show that 78% of COVID
-19 related deaths in the nation are people 65 or older. For 
that reason, some economists and public health profession-
als prefer to use quality of adjusted life years (QALY), to 
account for the age distribution of mortality from COVID-
19. Their point of view is that reducing mortality for a per-
son of 80 should be valued differently from reducing mor-
tality for a person 10-years of age. Other economists 
(Greenstone and Nigam) use an age-dependent VSL from 
$14.7 million for children 0-9 years of age to $1.5 million 
for people 80 and older. These two approaches are more 
controversial and not used here.  
Using the VSL of $10 million, the gross benefits of the NPIs 
in Nebraska (state, local, and national) to decrease mortality 
due to COVID-19 are estimated at around $2.80 billion, 
with a large range of gross benefits ($.500 to $10 billion). 
The range reflects the considerable uncertainty on death 
projections discussed previously. Based on national data, 
the benefits of reduced COVID-19 mortality are strongly 
skewed in favor of the older segments of the population and 
that should hold for Nebraska as well1. Using age-adjusted 
VSLs would dramatically lower this estimate. 
Regarding reductions of morbidity measures of COVID-19, 
Kaiser Permanente estimates that COVID-19 hospital stays 
without complication would cost about $10,000 per stay.; 
those with complications would cost on average about 
$20,000 per stay. Cases requiring ventilators would cost 
much more, especially if ventilation is required for more 
_____________________ 
1 According to CDC data as reported on April 15, an 85 year old 
and over is 31 times more likely to die of COVID-19 than a 45-54 
year old person. . This is calculated by taking the ratio of the 
COVID-19 mortality rate of the two groups (0.042/0.0013) as 
reported by the CDC on April 15.  
than four days (Rae et al.). The cost of cases with venti-
lation goes up from $34,000 for less than 4 days to 
$88,000 beyond 4 days. We average the latter figures to 
value a ventilated case saved. As explained above, pro-
jected hospital admissions are 1370 including 350 ICU 
interventions of which 308 are ventilated cases. Again, 
if we assume that NPIs reduce morbidity incidences by 
50%, as for mortality reduction, we can develop back-
of-the-envelope estimates of the morbidity savings 
from NPIs. These savings are worth about $30 million. 
These are negligible compared to the gross benefits of 
the reduction in mortality. All these figures are impre-
cise and tentative, but they provide orders of magni-
tude and ranges of values, which are insightful.  
The GDP of Nebraska was 127 billion dollars 
(rounded) in 2019, the last year with detailed industry 
accounts. The projected gross benefits induced by NPIs 
to reduce mortality at all levels represent about 2.2% of 
GDP (2.80/127) and with a range of benefits (0.4% to 
7.9%).  
The Economic Cost Induced by the Pandemic and 
Associated Policies 
Beyond the health costs and savings discussed above, it 
is difficult to sort out the respective economic costs of 
the pandemic and the cost of the NPI policies and the 
disruption costs from NPIs and disruption abroad. It is 
also challenging to disentangle the costs of NPIs at the 
local, state and national levels. Humans have a strong 
sense of self-preservation and abate risk without NPIs. 
Elderly Americans voluntarily stay put at home and 
decrease consumption outside of the home. All these 
factors will require much data and economic modeling 
to be sorted out in the future. 
In Nebraska, to gauge the immediate economic impact 
of the crisis, we can observe jobless claims with little 
delay. The data are from the Nebraska Department of 
Labor. The latest available data on these claims are for 
April 4 (as of 4/15/2020). In the last 4 weeks about 
82,682 people filed for unemployment benefits, twice 
as many as the whole of 2019 (41,000 claims). Table 2 
shows a comparison for calendar years (CY) 2018-20 
for the first 15 weeks of the year. The impact is stagger-
ing.; the year 2020 had started as a year of strong job 
gains before the pandemic took place. 
The industry distribution of the job losses in the last 4 
weeks is shown in Table 3. The source is also the Ne-
braska Department of Labor. 
Table 2. Initial Unemployment Claims in Nebraska 
Week Ending Date Weeks CY 2020 CY 2019 CY 2018 2020-19 % Change 
1/4/2020 Week 1 1,149   1,310 1,925 -12.29% 
1/11/2020 Week 2 1,055   1,327 1,365 -20.50% 
1/18/2020 Week 3 951   1,210 1,056 -21.40% 
1/25/2020 Week 4 967   1,127 922 -14.20% 
2/1/2020 Week 5 825   1,042 807 -20.83% 
2/8/2020 Week 6 690   860 789 -19.77% 
2/15/2020 Week 7 558   737 687 -24.29% 
2/22/2020 Week 8 487   701 729 -30.53% 
2/29/2020 Week 9 497   744 812 -33.20% 
3/7/2020 Week 10 500   722 706 -30.75% 
3/14/2020 Week 11 796   781 719 1.92% 
3/21/2020 Week 12 15,666   730 732 2046.03% 
3/28/2020 Week 13 24,533   643 613 3715.40% 
4/4/2020 Week 14 26,542   584 606 4444.86% 
4/11/2020 Week 15 15,944   573   533 2682.55% 
Industry Sector 
4 weeks 
Ending 4/11/20 
GDP contribution in 
2019 GDP ($ billion) 
Accommodation and Food Services  16,596  2.81 
Health Care and Social Assistance  10,856  10.072 
Retail Trade  10,032  6.771 
Other Services, Ex. Public Admin  7,791  2.609 
Manufacturing  4,678  13.455 
Administrative and Waste Services  4,106  3.546 
Construction  3,606  3.501 
Educational Services  2,944  1.07 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation  2,700  0.736 
Professional and Technical Services  2,155  5.625 
Transportation and Warehousing  1,993  10.517 
Wholesale Trade  1,543  7.932 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing  1,015  12.913 
Information  964  3.735 
Finance and Insurance  879  12.699 
 Total (all claims number of people)  82,682  $97.98 billion 
Table 3. Initial Unemployment Insurance Claims by Major Industry 
The table shows that all industries have been affected, but 
particularly and disproportionally, “nontraded” services 
industries, not directly affected by global or international 
shocks but rather by local, state, or regional shocks and 
distancing policies. The implied unemployment rate is 
around 12% as of April 11 if one adds the latest unemploy-
ment figures to the March rate of 4.2% reported by the 
Nebraska Department of Labor. 
Looking at the impact by occupation from the same data, 
the most affected categories are in decreasing order Wait-
ers and Waitresses; Hairdressers, Hairstylists, and Cos-
metologists; Bartenders; Retail Salespersons; Childcare 
Workers; Cooks, Restaurant; Cashiers; Dental Assistants; 
Customer Service Representatives; Managers, All Other; 
Dental Hygienists; and Manicurists and Pedicurists. Most 
of these jobs cater to local markets. These formerly active 
workers will receive some unemployment benefits, which 
in many cases will not replace lost earnings and economic 
security. These lost jobs also reflect forthcoming business 
closures and bankruptcies.  
Given the lack of data, it is hard to gauge the economic 
value of these losses in these industries and occupations. 
One can look at the importance of these sectors in the Ne-
braska economy to have a sense of what is impacted. Our 
state GDP was $127 billion in 2019. The impacted sectors, 
with the highest unemployment claims, represented nearly 
$98 billion out of $127 billion of GDP last year. Table 3 
shows each industry that lost the most jobs and with their 
contribution to our state GDP as of last year. Of course, 
some activity remains, but the figures suggest how deep 
the shock is and will be. These costs, largely imposed by 
distancing policies, not all state or local, are likely to dwarf 
the gross benefits from the reduced mortality in Nebraska. 
The distancing policies made much sense initially for pre-
cautionary reasons, given the many unknown implications 
of the pandemic. Now we know that mortality is limited 
but significant for elderly people. We also learned that 
NPIs are disproportionally benefiting the elderly and peo-
ple with comorbidities from the health perspective. On the 
economic front, current NPIs especially handicap younger 
adults and their families employed in service industries, in 
Nebraska, as well as the older adults in these industries. 
Those with morbidities in these industries, face a difficult 
tradeoff between reduced health risk and vanished earn-
ings. Everyone has been affected negatively by the NPIs, 
through reduced portfolio value, lost jobs, reduced busi-
nesses, etc. Do these blanket NPIs still make sense now, 
given the induced economic disaster and the increasingly  
________________ 
The 4.2% unemployment rate is computed using the reference 
week ending on March 14, as indicated in the Nebraska Depart-
ment of Labor press release of April 17. The subsequent weeks 
experienced the surge in claims as shown in Table 2.  
precarious situation many Nebraskans are facing? The 
policy process should debate these tradeoffs more vig-
orously.  
Potential Policy Options in Nebraska 
Given the tremendous impact on these industries and 
occupations, can we design better-targeted distancing? 
Distancing will have to stay until an effective vaccine, 
or much more effective treatments are discovered to 
treat acute cases. 
First, as stated elsewhere, some blanket sanitary policies 
could be required (mask wearing in commercial loca-
tions, more extensive use of gloves, etc.). Similarly, rap-
id testing should be widely available and widespread 
and with the capability of self-administration. The lat-
ter may still take time to scale up. 
The heterogeneity of the coronavirus risk across age 
groups suggests that health risk is very moderate for 
young people and adults without comorbidity. Mortali-
ty is nearly nonexistent for the young. Adults younger 
than 60 and without morbidity also face low-risk as 
suggested above. The health risk, especially mortality, 
rises dramatically for the elderly. It also rises for adults 
with comorbidity. How to protect the elderly and allow 
less stringent distancing for the young and adults? For 
instance, schools are risk vectors for older teachers and 
teachers with morbidities. Another group at risk with 
school reopening is the elderly in multi-generational 
households. So designing ways to protect the latter two 
groups and reopen schools should be possible.  
Teachers in risk groups could receive a medical health 
score and be excused above a certain level of risk. They 
could still do some teaching remotely with the help of a 
teacher assistant in the classroom. One could also give 
incentives for early retirements for older teachers inter-
ested in exiting their profession. Elderly people in multi
-family households could be provided with accommo-
dations to self-quarantine. In addition, traceability us-
ing frequent testing and phone apps could help locate 
and trace infected people to reduce risk, including in 
schools. This is practiced and enforced in several Asian 
countries with success. These practices raise privacy 
issues but can be workable as the car insurance indus-
try does with young drivers. Signing-up for the app and 
good driving behavior lead to a lower premium (here it 
could be a health insurance premium). These ideas 
could also apply to our daycares and universities and 
other adult-learning facilities. The Extension service at 
the University of Nebraska and other state agencies 
could provide education services on how to effectively 
self-quarantine and practice good hygiene to limit the 
contagion. This step, reopening schools, will also allow 
young parents to return to work for those who worked 
from home and  
from home and remain employed. Productivity should rise 
dramatically! 
Reopening Retail and Food Services  
One could conceive reopening retail businesses, using seg-
regated hours for people at risk. Many stores already pro-
vide discounts and special hours for seniors. The same idea 
could be used to reopen retail shops. For example, retail 
businesses would scrub and the stores could open early, say 
twice a week, to elderly costumers only and allow them to 
shop safely with good distancing in the retail location. Then 
lower risk groups could use the stores, still with safe dis-
tance with masks, etc. 
Restaurants could do the same with early opening “happy 
hours,” exclusively for the elderly and people at risk. Some 
of these strategies may not work if groups at risk remain 
cloistered at home, but at least activity could resume. Res-
taurants will have to respect distancing within their space. 
The staff has the potential to be a vector of contamination. 
Hygiene would have to be beefed up. We already have 
health inspections for food services. These inspections 
should be strengthened with a focus on mask wearing, 
hand washing, glove wearing etc. in the medium terms. 
Restaurants will have to innovate more enticing take-out 
packages, home catering, or segregated smaller dining 
rooms.  
For each retail and service sector, and with concerted 
efforts, one could imagine how to restart many subsectors 
of these industries, while limiting contamination.  
Using the rural-urban heterogeneity, one notes that rural 
areas are much less affected than urban ones in Nebraska. 
The Omaha, Lincoln, and Grand Island areas have the ma-
jority of cases in Nebraska. The interstate corridor also ex-
hibits higher cases. Outside of these areas, rural counties 
should have more leeway to cautiously relax rules and let 
business go on as usual. 
Exploiting these dimensions (age, health, and geographical 
location) for more flexible, local and state policies could 
already bring back considerable economic activity. 
Remaining Issues 
A myriad of economic issues remain with defaults and late 
payments and shocks at the national and international lev-
els. These are not easily actionable at the state or local lev-
els. The travel and tourism industries will take much time 
to recover as long as borders and travel remain restricted. 
One could think of a COVID-19 “yellow” book like the vac-
cination book to travel internationally to riskier destina-
tions. Travelers would have to show that they took a recent 
coronavirus test and are negative before they can hop on a 
plane. Airlines have been devastated once again. The car 
industry will also take time to recover given the credit con-
straints many families are facing. No silver bullet here. 
Agriculture is also deeply impacted by the crisis, with 
no easy remedy in sight. Trade costs for agriculture 
exports, for example, have nearly doubled with disrup-
tions in logistics and harbors, especially with labor 
shortages. Reduced foreign demand also affects export 
demand. Commodity prices have fallen quite signifi-
cantly for Midwest commodities (Hart et al.). The latter 
authors estimate overall annual damage for Iowa’s agri-
culture sector of $788 million for corn, $213 million for 
soybean, $2.5 billion for ethanol, $658 million for fed 
cattle, $34 million for calves and feeder cattle, and $2.1 
billion for hogs. One would expect comparable losses 
for Nebraska’s agriculture. Farm programs will com-
pensate for some of these losses, but not all. Food sup-
ply chains have to reorganize to address labor shortag-
es and repackaging away from food services towards 
home-preparation formats. See also the Cornhusker 
Economics issue of April 16 on how to manage COVID-
19 related risk and commodity price risk. 
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